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THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
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v. : 
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SUMMARY 
Mr. Nguyen was not required to marshal his challenge to the trial court's legal 
conclusion but even if marshaling was necessary, the requirement was met. Mr. 
Nguyen's argument that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for mistrial also 
did not require him to marshal the evidence as he was not challenging a finding of fact. 
A mistrial was warranted where the prosecutor's improper comments on Mr. Nguyen's 
decision not to testify were meant to bolster the sole material witness' credibility and 
focus the jury on Mr. Nguyen's silence as substantive evidence of his guilt. Where the 
issue of guilt or innocence lies solely with the testimony of the child witness, adherence 
to the rights and rules designed to sift truth from error is critical. 
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POINT I. MR. NGUYEN CHALLENGES THE TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL 
CONCLUSION AND THEREFORE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO 
MARSHAL BUT EVEN IF MARSHALING WAS NECESSARY, THE 
REQUIREMENT WAS MET. 
Mr. Nguyen argued in his opening brief that the trial court failed to comply with 
the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-411, Utah Rule of Evidence 15.5 and 403 
before admitting the videotaped interview into evidence at trial. See Aplt. Opening Brief 
9-17. Whether the trial court correctly admitted the videotape under these provisions is a 
question of law. See State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 125 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); see also 
State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ^[11, 218 P.3d 610 ("[T]he interpretation of a rule of 
procedure is a question of law that we review for correctness.") (quotation and citation 
omitted); State v. Germonto, 2003 UT App 217, Tf6, 73 P.3d 978 ("Statutory 
interpretation is a matter of law, which [this Court] review[s] for correctness."). The 
State is attempting to escape review of the merits by arguing that Mr. Nguyen was 
required to marshal the evidence or that he inadequately briefed. See Appellee Brief 13-
26. The State's argument is unsupported. 
The issue before the Court is whether the trial court erred in admitting the 
videotape without making the required statutory determination that good cause existed, 
that the best interests of justice were served and that probative value of the tape 
outweighed any unfair prejudice. See Aplt. Opening Brief 9-17. The issue requires this 
Court to interpret Utah Code Ann. §76-5-411 and Utah Rule of Evidence 15.5 and 
determine whether the trial court failed to make those required findings. Mr. Nguyen's 
argument in relations to the trial court's findings is that those required to support good 
cause and best interests were not made as mandated by the statute and rule. Because Mr. 
Nguyen's arguments only address the legal sufficiency of the findings under the 
applicable statute and rule, marshaling is not required. See Utah R. App, P. 24(a)(9) ("A 
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding."). 
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Even if the State were correct and Mr. Nguyen's argument did require him to 
marshal, that requirement was met where Mr. Nguyen "summarize[ed], or ;marshal[ed]'" 
the State's arguments for the videotapes admission. See Aplt Bri6f 13-16. Furthermore, 
"the marshaling requirement is not a limitation on the power of the appellate courts" and 
this Court has the discretion to reach the merits of issues where the duty to marshal the 
evidence is imposed but not met. See Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42,1fl[18-21, 164 P.3d 384 (noting the marshaling 
requirement is "not, itself, a rule of substantive law"). In addition, the State's assertion 
that the issue was inadequately briefed is without merit as Mr. Nguyen supported his 
argument with the appropriate statute, rules and applicable case law. See Aplt. Brief 9-
17. Therefore, this Court should reach the merits of Mr. Nguyen's argument that the trial 
court improperly admitted the videotaped testimony into evidence. 
The State further misinterprets Mr. Nguyen's argument regarding the prejudice he 
suffered as a result of having the videotape testimony admitted. The prejudice does not 
stem from Mr. Nguyen's choice not to cross-examine the child witness but from the 
needless cumulative presentation and bolstering of the witness' testimony. See Aplt. 
Brief 14-17; Utah R. Evid. 403. Under Utah Rule of Evidence 403, this video was 
needlessly cumulative of the child witness's testimony and there was no need to admit it 
given the witness's ability to testify on the stand completely and "articulate[ly]" 
regarding her allegations. The presentation of this video to the jury followed by the 
witness's testimony relating the allegations of abuse a second time was prejudicial and 
substantially outweighed any probative value it may have had. Utah R. Evid. 403. 
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POINT II. MR. NGUYEN'S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED 
ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO GRANT A MISTRIAL AFTER THE 
PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS VIOLATED HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT 
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION DID NOT REQUIRE MARSHALING BUT 
PREJUDICED MR. NGUYEN REQUIRING REVERSAL. 
As noted above Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) only requires a party to 
"marshal all record evidence" when that party is "challenging a feet finding." See Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Mr. Nguyen's argument that the trial court erred in failing to grant a 
mistrial after the prosecutor's indirect comments on his decision not to testify violated his 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination resulting in prejudice does not fit under 
the State's ubiquitous attempts to expand the marshaling requirement to avoid review of 
the issues on the merits. The prosecutor's several implicit references on Mr. Nguyen's 
failure to testify prejudiced him necessitating a new trial. 
Contrary to the State's assertions, the prosecutor in this case was not merely 
"argu[ing] the strength of the prosecution's case," but attempted to bolster the child 
witness's credibility at the expense of Mr. Nguyen's choice not to testify. The 
prosecutor's comments were not aimed at "fairly responding to an argument of the 
defendant" or in response to claims by Mr. Nguyen that he was not "afforded" the 
opportunity "to explain his side of the case" like the defendant in United States v. 
Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 32 (1988), the case cited by the State to support the prosecutor's 
prejudicial comments. Instead, "the prosecutor on his own initiative ask[ed] the jury to 
draw an adverse inference from [Mr. Nguyen's] silence" which case law clearly holds 
violates "the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination." Robinson, 485 U.S. at 32 
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(noting the prosecutor is prohibited "from suggesting to the jury that it may treat the 
defendant's silence as substantive evidence of guilt"). 
Many cases involving allegations of child sexual abuse, like this one, hinge on the 
credibility of a child witness. Seldom can physical evidence be offered to refute the 
allegation of sexual abuse. State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, «|[12, 992 P.2d 951 
(recognizing the evidentiary difficulties that confront a defendant in litigating these types 
of cases ). In such cases, it is critical that "the governing evidentiary and procedural rules 
designed to enable a trier of fact to sort out truth from falsehood . . . be applied with 
punctiliousness to avoid factual error and injustice." Id [^14. Additionally, 
"[p]rosecutors have a duty to eschew all improper tactics." Id. <p 1 (quotation and 
citation omitted). "It is as much [a prosecutor's] duty to refrain from improper methods 
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring 
about a just one." Id. (quotation and citation omitted). 
In this case, the prosecutor "call[ed] the jurors' attention to matters not proper for 
their consideration and [those] comments ha[d] a reasonable likelihood of prejudicing the 
jury by significantly influencing its verdict." State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, [^18, 8 P.3d 
1025. The prosecutor's comments exceeded the limits of permissible comment in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment. The cumulative error of this violation together with 
the improper admission of the videotaped testimony of the sole material witness 
substantially prejudice Mr. Nguyen resulting in an unfair trial. State v. Havatone, 2008 
UTApp 133,^8, 183P.3d257. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above and more fully set out in Appellant's opening brief, 
Mr. Nguyen respectfully requests this Court to reverse his convictions and remand for a 
new trial. 
SUBMITTED this _ \ _ day of June, 2010. 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
STEPHEN W. HOWARD 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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